penalties for multiple [violating communications] , is what it is." 9 It forbids any person from mak [ing] any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call, [or] . . . initiat [ing] any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party. 10 The TCPA applies to text messages 11 and also prohibits the use of "any [fax] machine, computer, or other device to send . . . an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine" unless the sender has an established business relationship with the recipient or the recipient has agreed to receive the fax. 12 The TCPA's scope of liability is vague. In 2015, following the proposal of Chairman Thomas Wheeler, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued several declaratory rulings intended to clarify how it will enforce the TCPA. 13 For example, the FCC defines an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) to include any machine capable of dialing random or sequential numbers.
14 However, virtually any telephone or computer can function as an ATDS. 15 This "clarification" is so unhelpful that the Third Circuit promptly criticized it as "hardly a model of clarity." 16 Dissenting FCC commissioners worry that the FCC's declaratory rulings have "further increased liability for good actors" 17 and will "target useful communications between legitimate businesses and their customers."
18
To determine the portion of the TCPA's statutory damages that is punitive rather than compensatory, one can subtract from the statutory damages the recipient's actual harm, which I estimate generally to be between 6.8 cents 70.7 cents per violating 9.
Id. 10. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B); see also Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-cv-00857, 2016 WL 228345, at *3 (Jan. 20, 2016) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) A statutory penalty violates due process when it "is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable." 21 The Supreme Court has said that excessive punitive damages can "enter the zone of arbitrariness" that violates due process, 22 and that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers" for punitive damages "are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in the range of 500 to 1." 23 Thus, for the punitive component of the TCPA's statutory damages to comply with the Court's reasoning in State Farm, the actual harm from a single TCPA violation must be at least $50-which, as my economic analysis reveals, is unlikely. Given the large implicitly punitive component of the TCPA's statutory damages, it is understandable that two district courts have not dismissed out of hand the possibility that statutory damages in a TCPA class action might violate due process as applied. dial every active phone number in a given area code at random. 26 Junk faxes imposed on the recipient the costs of paper, ink, and incremental wear-and-tear of her fax machine, as well as the nuisance of having her fax machine unavailable to use while junk faxes were arriving. Furthermore, the TCPA also accounts for wasted time that a violation causes. Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has said that "[e]ven a recipient who gets [a] fax on a computer and deletes it without printing suffers some loss: the value of the time necessary to realize that the inbox has been cluttered by junk."
27
The "difficult to quantify" costs of
Whether the TCPA today violates due process as applied depends on the specific circumstances surrounding the violating communication. One consequence of the ubiquity of mobile phones is that the interruption and distraction of a violating communication now can follow the recipient, including when the person is driving a car. Thus, a violating communication might cause or aggravate driver distraction and thus increase the likelihood of an accident, whose actual harm could easily equal or even exceed the amount of the TCPA's statutory damages. (Of course, whether a communication violating the TCPA is the proximate cause of such an accident would be a separate question of tort law, since even a cellphone call or text message that the driver wished to receive while driving could distract her and thus increase the likelihood of an accident.) The pervasiveness and easy portability of mobile phones make it difficult to predict the setting in which a person will receive a violating communication, such that a TCPA violation could cause harm in ways that Congress never expected in 1991.
II. CALCULATING A VIOLATING COMMUNICATION'S ACTUAL HARM I calculate here the average harm that a violating communication imposes on its recipient.
30 I analyze the actual harm from a violation for each communication channel through which such a violation can occur-a mobile phone call, a landline phone call, a text message, and a fax. The actual harm from a violating communication equals the sum of (1) the cost of the transmission of the advertisement (for example, the cost (if any) that the recipient incrementally pays to her mobile network operator to receive a text message) and (2) the opportunity cost of the time that the recipient spends receiving and Next, to calculate the opportunity cost of the time required to receive a violating communication, I use the average U.S. hourly wage to estimate the opportunity cost of a recipient's time. Economists commonly use the wage rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of a person's time when calculating the value of delay, nuisance, or wasted timefor example, when analyzing the optimal level of traffic congestion for purposes of assessing the net societal benefit from a proposed freeway or subway.
33 A consumer's wage rate is the opportunity cost of her time because the time that she spends answering a telemarketing call she could instead spend working and earning a wage. For example, if a consumer's hourly wage is $15, then one can estimate that the consumer values her time at $15 per hour, because, in theory, a person works until the value of an hour worked is equal to the value gained from not working (that is, value from instead consuming leisure). To estimate the recipient's opportunity cost of receiving a violating communication, I analyze the income that an average American would have earned in the amount of time during which she took (and terminated) the violating call. As a factual matter, the actual harm that a TCPA violation imposes on its recipient will vary from case to case and from person to person.
In December 2014, the average U.S. hourly wage was $24.62. 34 For simplicity, I assume that the average violating call to a mobile phone or landline takes ten seconds, that it takes ten seconds to read and delete an unwanted marketing text message, and that it takes ten seconds to identify, ignore, and discard an unwanted fax advertisement. Thus, the opportunity cost of receiving a violating mobile phone call, a violating landline call, a 31. For simplicity, my calculation of harm assumes that a violating communication has zero offsetting benefit. Whether or not a violating call results in any benefit for the called party, and what the magnitude of that benefit is, are both factual questions that will vary from person to person. Any benefit that the called party derives from a violating call would reduce the total harm to the called party and therefore produce a greater punitive damages multiplier. violating text message, and a violating fax is 6.8 cents. 35 In certain cases, the TCPA also imposes liability for callers even if the call's intended recipient does not answer the phone. 36 For simplicity, I assume that the harm that such a call imposes-in other words, the opportunity cost of the time it takes to notice a missed call, or to listen to a voicemail-is equal to the harm imposed by a call answered by its intended recipient. However, whether that assumption holds true is a fact-based inquiry that might vary from case to case and from person to person. Table 1 below summarizes my calculation to determine the total actual harm that different kinds of TCPA violations impose on their recipients. Note: I assume that the average fax advertisement is four pages long, which is likely an exaggeration. I use the Producer Price Index (PPI) to adjust the estimated cost of $0.10 per fax page from October 1992 USD to December 2014 USD. I treat the transmission cost for a landline phone call as zero, because providers of landline phone service in the United States do not charge subscriber for incoming calls. To determine the damages range, I subtract the total harm from the violating communication from the least ($500) and greatest ($1,500) statutory damages amounts. I then divide those differences by the total actual harm from the violating communication to determine the least and greatest damages multiple for that violation.
The actual harm that a violating communication imposes on its recipient varies significantly, depending on the method of communication. Thus, when analyzing whether the TCPA violates due process as applied, it is essential to consider all the facts of the violating communications, so as to measure accurately the actual harm that those communications cause.
In sum, a violating communication causes actual harm of between 6.8 cents and 70.7 cents per violating communication, depending on the communication channel used. The remainder of the TCPA's statutory damages is purely punitive. Thus, the punitive component of the TCPA's statutory damages is between 706 and 22,058 times the actual harm that a violating communication imposes on the recipient. 
